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Abstract 
The paper shows the impact on consumers of privatization and liberalization in the 
telecommunication sector for 15 EU Countries. Policy reforms are summarized by 
the OECD regulatory indicators (REGREF) that consider the extent of 
privatization, vertical disintegration, and market entry. After controlling for other 
country variables, first, a test of the impact of ownership and regulatory changes 
on consumer prices is given. In a second step, the Eurobarometer data on 
consumers’ satisfaction about quality and prices of the telecommunication service 
are considered. The analysis confirms the importance of market regulation in 
reducing prices but minimize the role played by privatization per se. Overall, the 
findings offer only mixed evidence, and somehow contradict, the hypothesis that 
all the reforms work in a similar way across the EU countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The telecom sector is not just one among the network industries that experienced a 
policy paradigm shift over the last twenty years: it has been its core laboratory 
world-wide and the one where the reforms started earlier. If one had to pick up a 
single year as the turning point, 1984 would be the most convenient one, with the 
parallel divestiture of AT&T in the US and of British Telecom in the UK. The 
meaning of divestiture was however quite different across the two sides of the 
Atlantic. AT&T was a private regulated monopolist that was broken up in seven 
regional Bell operating companies. British Telecom was a public corporation that 
after privatization was under a regime of regulated duopoly along with another 
privatized operator, Mercury. In both cases, institutional changes, away from 
regulated and integrated monopoly in the US, and from integrated public 
monopoly in the UK, were officially motivated by a willingness to establish 
competition in the industry. It has been widely acknowledged that to ensure an 
effective transition to a competitive market, however, divestiture policies need to 
be accompanied by regulatory reforms. The simple change of the ownership 
structures, from public to private, in fact, is not sufficient for the market to 
become effectively opened, breaking up the monopolies, and guaranteeing better 
conditions for private investors to enter the market. In most countries, 
governments surrendered their powers to national regulatory authorities, with the 
aim of overseeing and regulating the interactions between incumbents and entrant 
firms (Edwards & Waverman, 2006), protecting the consumers, and ensure 
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adequate infrastructure investments (Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti & Schiantarelli, 
2005). 
At the same time, a dramatic process of technological change reshaped the 
industry. Regulators and law-makers had to frequently adjust their views because 
of entirely new developments. The new industry reform paradigm points to 
privatization and liberalization (Newbery, 2000). 
This paper wants to test whether the reform process, as measured by regulatory 
indicators, is correlated with benefits to the consumers. After all the final 
evaluation of the reforms should be based on testing what it delivers to the users 
of the service. Ideally one would look to detailed case histories, considering long 
time series. A complementary approach would be to consider cross-country 
evidence. Under the latter perspective, the EU offers something near to a natural 
experiment. On one side, there is one policy actor, the European Commission, 
who pushes towards a well defined reform package, as embodied in telecom 
directives; on the other side, there are the member states that, more or less in 
compliance with the EU legislation, show big differences in reform design, 
sequencing, timing, market structures. Another attractive aspect of a cross-country 
empirical study is that, differently from other network industries, such as 
electricity, countries are not exogenously constrained in technology adoption by 
intrinsic geographic characteristics. This allows focusing on country differences in 
ownership, institutions, competition, and other industry features, under a common 
technological trend. 
In the present paper there is a focus on price trends in the EU-15 (i.e. before 
accession in 2004 and 2007 of mostly transition countries) on one side, and 
consumers satisfaction with prices (and quality) of the fixed telephone service, on 
the other side. A similar study in this context has been conducted by Copenhagen 
Economics (2005) for the European Commission. In the present study, however, 
there is a use of different data sources in order to enlarge the dataset and increase 
the number of observations. Moreover, it is also investigated the impact on other 
related prices borne by consumers, such as monthly telephone subscription and 
connection charges. Furthermore, the REGREF indicators for market regulation 
are used, as proposed by the OECD. For customers’ satisfaction the focus is on 
three waves of the Eurobarometer survey (2000, 2002, 2004), while for prices and 
other industry features on Eurostat and ITU data. 
The structure of the paper is the following one. The following section briefly 
reviews the empirical literature; Section 3 proposes a general theoretical 
framework; Section 4 presents data sources and some descriptive statistics, while 
Section 5 is about modelling price dynamics; Section 6 offers probit estimation of 
consumer satisfaction with prices and quality; the last section concludes with 
suggestions for further research and policy implications. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Despite the large body of empirical literature on telecommunication and its 
changing institutional setting, relatively little attention has been paid to price 
determinants. 
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Li and Xu (2004) use a large set of 177 countries over the period 1990-2001 to 
estimate the impact of privatization and competition in telecommunication with 
ITU and World Bank data. They find positive effects of privatization on output, 
productivity and resource allocation but their estimates show that full privatization 
increases both output and prices of local calls. They propose two possible 
explanations:  a combination of strong network externalities and non competitive 
behaviour among existing operators, or an increase in service quality (not captured 
by data) that drive up the cost of phone calls. However, they employ only simple 
dummy variables to capture shifts in regulation. Moreover, they do not find a 
significant effect of competition on prices and a modest one in containing the 
adverse effect of privatization (interaction term). 
Cave and Vogelsang (2003) point out that intermediate price can play an 
important role in promoting competition and influencing final prices, while Bauer 
(2003)  finds no statistical evidence of price increase eventually determined by the 
substantial license fee paid by mobile operators. 
In a recent paper Grzybowski (2008) examines, like in the present work, the 
impact of regulation on telecommunication prices estimating a reduced form 
model for European Union from 1998 to 2002.  Regulation and cost factors 
(including technology) explain 94% of price variation and the former has a 
significant negative impact on incumbent retail price. Prices are taken from the 
study Teligen realized for the European Commission, and cover a period of four 
years only. As measures for regulation he uses several micro variables taken from 
the different EC Implementation Reports like carrier pre-selection, number 
portability and local loop unbundling, and a dummy for market liberalization.  In a 
previous paper Grzibowski (2005) studied the mobile market estimating a reduced 
form model using panel data for the EU countries from 1998 to 2002 and showing 
the relationships between mobile and fixed telephony markets. Liberalization of 
fixed telephone has a negative impact on the prices for mobile services and a 
positive effect on the demand while competition enhancing measures like the 
introduction of number portability has a negative impact on mobile call prices. 
Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001) estimate a panel with data on 23 OECD countries in 
1991-97 and show that prospective competition (proxied by the number of years 
remaining to liberalization) and effective competition (proxied by the market share 
of new entrants) both reduce the price of all the telecommunication services but 
not clear evidence could be found concerning the effect of the ownership structure 
of the industry on performance and price. Edwards and Waverman (2006) study 
intermediate price in 15 European countries for few years (1997-2005) and find 
that public ownership increases interconnection prices while regulator’s 
independence decreases them. 
Estache, Goicochea, and Trujillo (2006), in a paper focused on the link between 
corruption and utilities reform, analyze a large sample of countries and find that 
privatization of incumbent telecom operator increases prices while establishing an 
independent regulatory authority decreases them. 
Gasmi and Virto (2010) study fixed charges for telephone and cellular prices in 29 
developing and 23 developed countries looking for the effect of different 
institutional governance and find that privatizations increase prices in developing 
countries while has no effect in developed economies. 
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As compared with earlier literature, in this paper longer time series and more 
detailed information on regulatory reforms in the EU have been considered in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
 
3. Conceptual model 
 
This section presents an illustrative framework for the determination of telephony 
price equilibria under different reform patterns1. It is assumed that there is one 
homogeneous fixed telephony service and one price for it (instead of a bundle of 
services and a combination of time-based tariffs, subscription rates, connection 
charges, rental prices of equipments, etc)2. The regulatory regimes that are going 
to be discussed are stylized as follows: first, a vertically integrated public 
monopoly; second, a privatized, but still vertically integrated monopoly, without 
any price regulation (except the constraint of no price discrimination across users); 
third, a price-cap regulation of the privatized monopoly; fourth, unbundling as a 
preliminary step to liberalization; fifth, a duopoly market, without price 
regulation; sixth, full market entry, as an extension of the previous case. In this 
setting, the main interest is to see how consumer’s prices change following a 
reform, after assuming that demand is exogenous. 
First, consider a telecom operator under a vertically integrated public monopoly, 
as it was common in the EU before mid 1980s (e.g. British Telecom, France 
Telecom, Telecom Italia, etc). The monopolist faces an exogenous linear demand 
curve for residential users, for a given per capita GDP: 
 
(1)      pPM = a-bq. 
 
The representative consumer responds to changes of per capita GDP over time 
simply by a shift of their Marshallian demand. This effect is captured by changes 
of the intercept a. There are no substitution effects (e.g. with mobile telephony). 
The demand is sensitive, however, to a set of country features, including 
consumers’ preferences. The public firm’s returns to scale are assumed to be 
constant in each time period and for each country. This assumption reflects a 
combination of zero marginal costs of the fixed telephony network, i.e., the natural 
monopoly segment of the industry, and of positive constant average and marginal 
costs of operation and sales. In general, marginal cost c of fixed telephony can be 
represented by a function of four variables (plus noise): population density, 
number of lines, technology change, and productivity per employee. 
One assumes that the public firm’s costs cPM are higher than in a first best 
economy benchmark c*, a value that can be inferred by engineering data, so that 
 
(2) cPM  = c* (1+). 
 
                                                 
1 See for details Ceriani & Florio, 2011 
2 This assumption should be seen just a heuristic device to present a simple theoretical model. Further 
research would try to disentangle conceptual models for different policies, including wholesale/access 
pricing and whether it tends to have an impact on the interconnection between different types of services. 
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For any given country and time, population density is given. The number of new 
switched lines, the speed of technology adoption (including investment and human 
capital accumulation) and productivity of the workforce (typically the number of 
switched lines per employee) may be partly hindered by lack of incentives of the 
management to minimize costs. 
Moreover, the parameter captures - for each country and time - both inefficiency 
because of lack of incentives to minimize costs by the managers, and rent 
extraction by policy makers (including a mark-up over costs, that generates profits 
for the Treasury) and by other stake-holders who actually control the firm 
(perhaps the trade unions). 
After allowing for this social cost of public provision, the managers are instructed 
by their principal to maximize consumer’s surplus, under strict budgetary 
constraint. Hence, the firm follows the traditional marginal cost rule for fixing 
price: 
 
(3)     pPM  = cPM = c* (1+). 
 
A demand shift over time under this assumption has no impact on equilibrium 
price, as only quantity of telephone service provided will respond (through a 
change from aft to af,t+1  for the same slope b). Prices, however, will respond to 
changes of c* (technology innovation, e.g. changes of switching technology, 
adoption of optical fibres, etc) and possibly of e.g. less harmful interference by 
government or trade unions, better management, release of investment constraints, 
decrease of the ‘fiscal’ mark-up). Over time the process results in lower cf,t+1PM  
and prices will tend to decrease, more or less slowly according to specific country 
and firm’s features, following the two different drivers: 
 
Quantity of service provided and the consumer’s surplus are: 
 
(4)           
b
caq PM  1*  
(5)        
b
caCS PM
2
1* 2  
 
Let us turn now to a different state of the world (time or country) where the 
government privatizes the public monopolist, without, however, imposing a price-
cap or rate-of-return regulation. The only regulatory rule is that price 
discrimination is forbidden. Since the private owner has an incentive to minimize 
costs, one assumes now that the management is instructed by the new principal to 
wipe away any inefficiency and to maximize profits. As a result the quantity and 
price of service provided change respectively to: 
 
(6)     qUpr  = (a-c*)/2b 
(7)     pUpr  = (a+c*)/2. 
 
c *
t  0;

t  0
pPM
t  0
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Here an increase of the demand for telephone services will raise prices and not just 
quantities, while a decrease of costs will decrease prices and increase quantities. 
By comparison of the price of the public and of the unregulated private monopoly, 
the reform will decrease prices whenever the inefficiency of the former exceeds 
the allocative inefficiency of the latter. The indifference value of the initial 
inefficiency parameter is simply 
 
(8)    pUpr=pPM Upr,PM= (a-c*)/2c 
 
This is also exactly the value that makes the consumer’s surplus the same in the 
two ownership règimes, being CS under private monopoly now: 
 
(9)     CSUpr = (a-c*)2/8b 
 
In general, however, the indifference conditions between two regulatory regimes 
will be different for prices and for consumer’s surplus, as shown below. 
In another country or time, the government appoints a telecom regulator with the 
power to impose a price-cap to the privatized incumbent. The regulator perfectly 
knows the technology of the regulated firm, and picks up a price constraint 
sufficient to offer the private investor an ‘adequate’ profitability. Suppose that for 
any time period there is a simple mark-up  over the first best (or minimum) 
marginal cost that is incentive compatible. The new quantity and price equilibrium 
is now: 
 
(10)     qRpr = [a-c*(1+b 
(11)     pRpr = c* (1+

The optimal production plan of the telephone operator is exactly the same that 
under the unregulated regime. Moreover, price is not affected by the change of 
ownership plus regulation whenever 
Again, the inefficiency parameter of the public monopoly sets a threshold for price 
indifference after the reform.  Moreover, and differently from the previous case, 
demand or technology shocks will not change the price. The adjustment is entirely 
through quantity, while the firm will earn more or less profits simply as a result of 
these adjustments given the mark-up (in fact, and in a RPI-x setting,  will be 
gradually adjusted by the regulator for nominal price changes and available 
information on productivity increase). 
Now consider a different reform arrangement, where the regulator imposes to the 
incumbent the ownership or legal separation of the network, as recently 
(September 2008) required by the European Parliament. This new reform is best 
seen as preparation to granting access to entrants. One may start with the simplest 
case, the establishment of a legal duopoly, as it existed in the UK in the 1980s, 
with BT as the incumbent and Mercury as the sole entrant. At the same time (and 
differently from the British example at that time) suppose that the price-cap is 
lifted. 
The unbundling of the telephone network (an example is Openreach division of 
BT in recent years) has some administration and coordination costs. Moreover, 
both the incumbent and the entrant will face additional costs as compared with the 
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vertically integrated monopoly arrangement, because of the increasing marginal 
costs of operations and sales, as mentioned above. It is described simply by 
 
(12)     CD= c*(1+), 
 
where  is the combined effect of the extra-costs of unbundling and loss of 
economies of scale. One may assume here that the extra-cost is entirely loaded to 
the entrant. 
In order to see what happens to prices, one adopts here the Chamberlin (1948) 
‘small group’ competition model. There is no possibility of collusion (the 
regulator is in charge of preventing this) or of strategic behaviour. The entrant 
assumes that a share of the market is left unexploited by the incumbent. Thus the 
entrant fixes its optimal quantity and price supply of the service based on the free 
segment of the demand curve. Price is clearly less than for the incumbent’s 
segment, and because the telephone service is homogeneous, the incumbent must 
fix the price at the new lower level. Simple algebraic manipulation of the above 
conditions for the unregulated monopoly gives now3: 
 
(13)     qD = (a+c*(3+2))/4b 
(14)     pD = (3a+c*(3-2))/4 
 
This regulatory mechanism can be seen as an alternative to price cap regulation, 
because the incumbent is forced to adopt the equilibrium price in the entrant’s 
market, and to provide access to the network. 
Thus it is possible to compute the  value that the regulator in the previous case 
should use, if incentive-compatible, to mimic the role of duopolistic competition 
and to achieve price indifference in the two cases. It is also possible to see what is 
the value of the  parameter that makes the equilibrium price of an unregulated 
duopoly the same as the vertically integrated public monopoly. By construction of 
the model, it turns out that the two conditions are the same: 
 
(15)    PM,D = Rpr,D  = (a – c* (1+2))/4. 
 
The response of the duopoly market prices and quantities to variations across 
countries or over time of the demand are again represented by shifts of the α 
parameter. Technological progress, investments, labour productivity, scale factors 
                                                 
3 The starting point is:  
2
*capUpr     and  
2
*caqUpr  . For the entrant, the new demand and 
marginal revenue are: bqcap DE 
2
*,  and bqcap MRE 2
2
*,  . Given that MR=MC, then 
)1(*2
2
*  cbqca , from which 
b
c
b
caq E
2
)1(*
4
*  . The total demand 
b
ca
b
ca
b
c
b
caqqq UED
4
)23(*
2
*
2
)1(*
4
*Pr   . 
Equations (14) directly follows by substituting Dq into the original demand function (1). 
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are represented by a decrease of c*. Hence, if in a given country f, the elasticity of 
telephone demand to GDP is 1, and real GDP increases by g percent, and 
minimum costs decrease by h, the new price will simply be: 
 
(16)    pD = ((a(1+g)+c*(1-h)(3-2)))/4. 
 
To study the impact on prices of market liberalization, one could add a second, 
third and so on entrant in the previous model. A straightforward approach is due to 
Cournot (1897), in his model with many competitors. After having unbundled the 
network, the regulator is now ready to offer a telephony license to any entrant. The 
total quantity of service supplied will now be QME= q1+q2+…qj+…+qn. 
Because for a generic j-th firm profit maximization implies 
 
(17)     p+(p/q)qj=cj 
 
where the l.h.s. is the marginal revenue, and r.h.s. is the marginal cost. Following 
Varian (1987), the second condition can be written as: 
 
(18)    p (1+(p/q) (Q/p) (qj/Q))=cj. 
 
By definition (p/q) (Q/p) is the elasticity to price of the industry demand curve, 
, while (qj/Q) is the market share of the entrant, sj.  Using this notation, the above 
condition for profit maximization can be written: 
 
(19)     p (1- 1/(/sj))=cj 
 
The /sj  ratio can be interpreted as the elasticity of the demand curve faced by the 
single entrant. The smaller the market share, the more elastic the demand. In this 
way, when sj = 1 the unregulated monopoly market structure is back, while as the 
market share tends to zero, the condition is the one of pure competition: price 
equals marginal cost. The latter, however, are again not equal to minimum cost c*, 
because in a network industry as fixed telephony, after unbundling, each firm will 
face decreasing returns, not matched by the increasing return of the natural 
component. As in the previous duopoly case, there will be an inefficiency factor , 
that is now an increasing function of the number of entrants, so that the marginal 
cost is: 
 
(20)     cn= c* (1+n).
 
Equivalence between prices under public vertically integrated monopoly, 
regulated privatized monopoly, and market opening is now given by the simple 
condition == n. 
To sum up:  telephone prices, in this simple framework, can vary across countries 
and over time because of forces that push in different directions. The change of 
regulatory regime, from vertical integration, either under public or private 
ownership, to unbundling and limited market opening, will lower prices only for 
some combinations of the  parameters, but not for all of them. It is difficult 
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to predict which of the above stylized arrangements will deliver lower prices to the 
consumer. When the vertically integrated public monopoly is very inefficient, 
even an unregulated private monopoly can lower prices. Price-cap regulation can 
mimic cost-plus inefficiency of the public firm or cost-plus a permitted mark up of 
an oligopoly. Market entry is an alternative to price regulation or public 
monopoly, but it needs costly access or network unbundling in some form, and 
cost duplications of several activities with increasing return to scale. 
Thus, it seems important to disentangle the effects on prices of changes of 
regulatory regime from other determinants. In other words, prices can respond, as 
already seen, directly to changes of market structures and demand, to changes of 
costs indirectly induced by regulatory reforms, or to exogenous trends of some 
costs. The empirical analysis should disentangle, as far as possible, these 
components of telephone price variation over time and across countries. 
 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
To answer the main question of the paper, two empirical analyses are proposed: an 
econometric analysis for the dynamics of prices of fixed telephone calls, and 
another one for subjective perception of the price and quality of the 
telecommunication services. In the first one the prices of fixed telephone calls are 
modelled in order to verify the impact of the reform process. The investigation 
concerns the 15 EU Countries for the period 1997-2003. Almost all the 
information concerning the telecommunication sector comes from the ITU World 
Telecommunication Indicators (2006) dataset. The database contains time series 
data, mainly collected from an annual questionnaire sent out by the 
Telecommunication Development Bureau (BDT) of ITU, for the years 1960, 
1965, 1970 and annually from 1975-2005 for around 100 sets of 
telecommunication/ICT statistics covering telephone network size and dimension, 
mobile services, quality of services, traffic, staff, tariffs, revenue and investment. 
The price indicators for fixed telephone calls, instead, come from the Eurostat 
dataset, and distinguish between 10 minutes local, national and international 
calls4. Using these three measures for the prices of fixed telecom calls provides a 
wider inspection about the effects of the policy intervention to enhance the 
liberalization of the market. Monthly telephone connection charges have also been 
considered in that part of total costs supported by the final users of the service. 
The REGREF regulatory dataset has been created by the OECD5. It collects 
information about indicators of privatization, liberalization and disintegration of 
services of general interest across the OECD countries for 18 years from 1975 to 
2003. Regarding the telecommunications sector the database provides information 
about three dimensions: public ownership, entry regulation and market structure. 
                                                 
4 In a previous version of the paper, the analysis was on the single indicator for the 3-minute fixed 
telephone local call (peak rate) collected by the ITU, mainly because of the long time series collected for 
the 15 EU countries. The results, however, probably were not significant for an overall quantification of 
the reform process, in that considering the local calls price only could underestimate the impact of the 
liberalization policies. 
5 See Conway & Nicoletti (2006) for further details. 
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In particular, concerning the fixed telephone market, the following variables are 
considered: 
-Public ownership: this series indicates the degree of public ownership in the 
industry. The variable is coded between 0 (private ownership) to 100 (public 
ownership) and is the percentage of shares in the PTO6 owned by government. 
-Entry regulation: this series is an indicator of legal conditions of entry in the 
market and can assume three values only: 0 (free entry), 1 (oligopoly) and 2 
(monopoly). 
-Market Structure: this variable indicates the market share of new entrants and it is 
coded from 0 to 100. In the empirical analysis, however, in order to simplify the 
interpretation of the results, the indicator has been recoded such that 100 becomes 
the situation of complete absence of liberalization. 
The REGREF database provides also a summing index, called Aggregate 
Telecommunications Regulatory Indicator (ATRI), that is a weighted mean of the 
three different time series. The time series starts in 1975 and ends in 2003. A 
decrease in the aggregate indicator represents an increase in the liberalization 
process. 
Among the explanatory variables, in the regression models discussed in the 
following section the number of fixed telecom lines (lines), the amount of 
investments in the telecommunication sector (investment), the number if ISDN 
channels (isdn channels) as a measure for the technological progress, the 
population density (density), and the number of subscribers in the mobile 
telephone sector (mob subscribers) are all included. A complete description of the 
data is reported in Table 1. Table 2 and Table 3 report some descriptive statistics 
and the correlations between the variables. 
Table 1-3 about here 
 
The second part of the empirical analysis, instead, concentrates on the relations 
between consumers’ subjective satisfaction, prices of the telecommunication 
services, and reforms. Consumers’ subjective satisfaction is measured in the 
Eurobarometer dataset, which collects information about approximately 1,000 
people in each European country in 2000, 2002 and 2004. The number of 
observations, thus, consists of about 15.000 individuals for each wave, for a total 
of more than 45.000 observations in the regression analysis. The satisfaction 
towards telecom services is coded with ordinal variables and, analogously to 
Eurobarometer (2005), consumers’ satisfaction about prices and quality is 
dichotomized into “satisfied” (=1) and “not satisfied” (=0). In particular, 
concerning the price of the service, “satisfied” collects all the individuals 
declaring the price is “fair”, while “not satisfied” those declaring the price in 
“unfair” or “excessive”. Concerning the quality of the service, the questionnaire 
indicates four categories, “very bad”, “fairly bad”, “fairly good” and “very good”. 
Most of the respondents have positive impressions about the quality, while only 
few of them respond negatively. In order to increase the variability of the 
phenomenon, “satisfied” collects those responding with “very good”, while “not 
satisfied” all the others. This is summarized in Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
                                                 
6 Public telecommunications operator. 
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Table 4 and 5 about here 
 
To account for the large differences in the elements appearing in the sample, one 
has  also to consider specific individual effects such as gender, age, marital status, 
education, occupation, political orientation. Moreover, in order to account for the 
differences among countries, country specific variables are considered, such as: 
real Gross Domestic Product growth (GDP), Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
inflation rate (ΔCPI), Per capita GDP (pcGDP), Employment growth (Δemp), 
population density, GINI index. As price and policy indicators, the same variables 
described above are used. 
 
 
5. Explaining telecommunication price dynamics 
 
The conceptual model presented in Section 3 can be translated in a standard 
demand-supply structural model augmented with regulatory variables. The general 
form of the model, taking inverse functions is the following one: 
 
(21)     Pdt=Pd(Qnt,Djt)  
(22)     Pst=Ps(Qnt,Szt,rit)  
 
where Pdt, and Pst are demand and supply prices, Qnt is the quantity of the n-th 
service demanded and supplied, Djt is a vector of demand shifters, Szt is a vector of 
cost shifters, and rit is a vector of regulatory variables. Examples of demand 
shifters are typically GDP per capita, or the demand for substitute goods, such as 
mobile phone services. Examples of supply shifters are technology variables, such 
as ISDN channels, along with the regulatory variables, related to ownership and 
entry regulation. It is assumed that regulatory variables are exogenous policy 
decisions. For examples, it seems realistic, and supported by country data and 
histories that the decision to privatize the PTO is unrelated to the previous 
relatively high or low price level of telecom services. The resulting price, from 
equations 21-22, is the short-term equilibrium price. Given this simple frame, 
similarly to previous estimates cited in earlier literature, one can directly estimate 
a reduced form empirical equation, in order to see how the variables influence the 
short-term price equilibria, as done by Grzybowski (2008), Edwards and 
Waverman (2006), Li and Xu  (2004), Gasmi and Virto (2010)7. Because of data 
limitation and more limited objective, the estimation of a structural model, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Hence, the empirical analysis is based on the specification and estimation of 
reduced equations for local, international and national prices, and connection 
charges. For each of the dependent variables, there is a regression model that 
includes, among the explanatory variables, aggregate or detailed measures of the 
level of privatization and market opening of the sector. Given the structure of the 
data, the empirical analysis is based on panel data techniques, with country fixed 
                                                 
7 See section 2. See also Kaplan (2000) or Reiss & Wolak (2007) for a detailed discussion on the 
relationship between structural and reduced form in economic models. 
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effects accounting for all the variability not explicitly modelled by the regressors. 
The general specification is the following 
 
(23)    itititiit rxp   '' 2100  
 
where β0 and β0i are the constant term and the country fixed effects respectively, 
β1 is the vector of parameters associated to the regressors xit, while β2 is the vector 
of parameters associated to the regulatory variables rit, i.e. alternatively the 
Aggregate Telecommunications Regulatory Indicator (ATRI), or the Public 
ownership, Entry regulation and Market structure. For each dependent variable 
four alternative specifications are proposed, which jointly represent the dynamics 
of prices in the fixed telephony sector8. 
The error term εit is expected to follow the standard hypotheses for the fixed 
effects models, i.e. null conditional expected value and homoskedasticity. 
However, the first hypothesis might be violated since some explanatory variables 
used in the regressions may be argued to be endogenous, such as investments, the 
number of lines, and the levels of the technological progress captured by the 
number of isdn channels. In order to control for the endogeneity of these variables, 
as far as possible, an instrumental variables fixed effects approach has been used. 
The instruments, due to the restricted amount of information from institutional 
data bases, are found by taking lagged values of all the variables used in the 
regressions, providing that there is no autocorrelation of the error terms. The 
Sargan J-test statistic and Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation are provided for 
each regression in order to check for the goodness of such instruments. The null 
hypothesis of exogenous instruments for the Sargan J-test, and the absence of 
autocorrelation can never be rejected by the data. 
 
5.1 International calls prices 
 
The results of the estimation procedures when the dependent variable is the 
indicator of the price for international calls are reported in Table 6. As mentioned 
before, four alternative specifications are reported. Columns A and B introduce the 
aggregate indicator ATRI for the liberalization policy interventions. The two 
specifications differ according to the presence, in column B, of the number of 
subscribers in the mobile telephony sector, mob subscribers. The third and fourth 
specifications, reported in column C and D, use the same regressors as A and B, 
but considering the disaggregated reform indicators, Entry regulation, Public 
ownership, and Market structure. 
When the aggregate indicator of market opening is included, from the results in 
column A it emerges that the coefficient is significant and positive, indicating that 
an increase in the liberalization process induces a reduction in the prices of 
international calls. The result, however, becomes less evident when controlling for 
the diffusion of mobile telephony, measured as the number of mobile subscribers. 
                                                 
8 In order to test for the appropriateness of the fixed effect panel data model, for all regressions, a random 
effect model has been estimated and an Hausman specification test performed to compare the two. The 
test, reported in the results in Table 6-9, is always significant, suggesting to reject the more efficient, but 
in this case inconsistent, random effect model. 
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In this second case, in fact, the coefficient continues to be positive, but becomes 
not significantly different from zero. A very similar pattern does appear when the 
focus moves on the distinct aspects of liberalization. In particular, in regression C, 
the only significant intervention policy concerns the market structure, indicating 
that a more liberalized market acts at reducing the levels of prices. This evidence, 
as before, disappears when introducing the number of mobile subscribers. The 
mobile sector, thus, clearly plays the role of competitor and the rapid diffusion of 
the latter contributes at reducing the prices of fixed telephone calls. The prices of 
international calls are also reduced with investments in the telecom sector, while 
the technological development seems to play a limited role. 
Table 6 about here 
 
5.2 National calls prices 
 
Table 7 reports the results for the explanations of the national calls prices. The 
results highlight a situation very similar to what discussed for the international 
calls prices. Among the regulatory variables, the only one that matters is the 
Market structure, and even in this case, with an impact that reduces (but is still 
significant) when controlling for the diffusion of the mobile telephony market. 
The amount of investment in the telecom sector is extremely important in 
explaining the level of national calls prices, as well as the technological progress. 
Table 7 about here 
 
5.3 Local calls prices 
 
The results for the dynamics of local calls prices are shown in Table 8. As in the 
previous cases, column A and B show the aggregate regulatory indicator, while 
column C and D include the detailed aspects of the regulator interventions. The 
coefficient of the aggregate indicator is positive and significantly different from 
zero, indicating the importance of the market liberalization for reducing the price. 
This result does not substantially change when controlling for the mobile market 
diffusion. 
When the disaggregated indicators are included, Market structure and Public 
ownership are significant and with the expected positive sign. Moreover, this 
result is robust to the two alternative specifications in C and D, i.e., with and 
without taking into account the role of the mobile telephone sector. The policies of 
privatization and liberalization, together contributed at reducing the prices of local 
calls9. The number of mobile subscribers, even in this case, plays a relevant role, 
though less important than for international and national calls prices. 
Table 8 about here 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The legal conditions for joining the market, never significant in the previous cases, here becomes 
slightly significant but with the unexpected, and of difficult interpretation, negative sign. The level of 
investments is never significant, while technological progress is significant but, with a surprising positive 
coefficient. 
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5.4 Connection charges 
 
The last model considers the dynamics of the connection charges, and the results 
are provided in Table 9. The aggregate index is positive and significant only when 
excluding the mobile diffusion indicator. The number of fixed telephone lines is 
always significant and positive, as well as the technological progress, which 
contributes at reducing this component of the fixed telephone prices. A surprising 
and remarkable result, instead, concerns the role played by the Entry regulation 
variable, which enters negatively in the explanation of the connection charges. 
More precisely, moving towards less restrictive legal conditions for entry into the 
fixed telephone market leads to an increase in the connection charges. In other 
words, the gains obtained in the decreasing levels of price calls, are partially 
compensated by the increasing of the connection charges. 
Table 9 about here 
 
 
6. Consumers’ satisfaction with telecom prices 
 
The previous section analyzed whether an objective measure of a key element of 
consumers’ welfare, such as the price they pay, is influenced by regulatory 
variables. This section extends the analysis by investigating whether subjective 
measures of satisfaction with telecommunication prices and quality are influenced 
by market reforms and prices. There are two reasons for looking into subjective 
evidence: perceptions are important per se, because they can influence government 
and regulators decisions; moreover, micro-information available to the individual 
user can be more revealing than the aggregate statistics used in the previous 
section, e.g. because of price discrimination across types of users. 
As one does not know the exact level of individual satisfaction, Si*, for each 
service, it is assumed that satisfaction is generated by a latent variable model: 
 
(24)     iii eXS  '*  
 
where i=1..N for a sample of N individuals, and Xi includes a set of individual 
characteristics (xijt), macroeconomic variables (zjt), and regulatory indicators for 
entry regulation, public ownership, and market structure and vertical integration 
(rjt). Telecommunication market prices (pjt) are also included among independent 
variables to verify whether subjective satisfaction depends on actual prices and 
whether the relationship between subjective satisfaction and regulatory variables is 
at all driven by the relationship between regulatory variables and market prices. 
Finally, ei is a continuously distributed variable independent from Xi, and accounts 
for unobserved heterogeneity. As Si* is latent, for each individual i, one can only 
observe 
 
(25)     )0(1 *  ii SS  
 
where 1(.) is equal to 1 if the argument is true, and equal to 0 otherwise. Assuming 
that ei is distributed as a standard normal the probit model will be: 
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(26)      
)()(1)|()|0()|1( *  XXXXePXSPXSP   
 
or, more explicitly, 
 
(27)    
)''''(),,,|1( 4321000 jtjtjtijttjjtjtjtijtijt przxprzxSP    
 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and  0j and  0t 
are country and year fixed effects, respectively. In Table 10 marginal effects for 
price (columns A and B) and quality (columns C and D) satisfaction are 
reported10. 
Concerning the consumers’ satisfaction about prices, the regulation variables 
appear to be important in explaining the probability of being satisfied. All policy 
indicators in fact, enter significantly, but the entry regulation variable shows a 
surprising positive sign11. This last result can be explained by observing that over 
the three years, only Portugal and Greece for the two years 2000 and 2002 (i.e. 
only 1 002 over the total amount of 47 284 observations) present values different 
from 0, which indicates free entry in the trunk telephony market. The other two 
policy indicators, market structure and public ownership, enter with negative signs 
and are statistically significant. 
The effect of price indicators in the explanation of consumers’ satisfaction is 
significant and negative, as expected, for national and international calls prices. 
The price of local calls have an ambiguous impact: it enters significantly with a 
positive sign in both specifications. The country fixed effects are extremely 
significant in almost all cases, pointing to national features not captured by the 
regulatory variables and the other controls. Finally, as 2000 is the base year, it is 
difficult to find evidence towards a significant increase of consumers’ satisfaction 
about the price of the telephony service. 
The same model structure has been used for investigating the satisfaction about 
the quality of the service12. Results, in terms of marginal effects, are reported in 
columns C and D of Table 10. Similarly with the previous case, Entry regulation 
enters significantly with a positive sign, indicating that legal conditions towards 
competition has a negative impact on the perception of higher quality. An opposite 
effect is provided by the market structure indicator, that enters significantly and 
with negative sign, indicating a higher perception of the quality of the service as 
the market becomes more open. Privatization does not offer a significant 
contribution in increasing the quality perception of the service. 
                                                 
10 As a robustness check, an ordered probit model considering all categories of satisfaction reported in the 
data has also been estimated. The results, however, especially for the coefficients associated to the 
regulatory variables, confirm that the loss of information coming from the dichotomization approximation 
does not alter the final message, gaining, however, in terms of simplicity of presentation and 
interpretation. 
11 See footnote 6. 
12 Consider this as a complement to the analysis of prices, as one could argue that higher prices may 
reflect a better service. 
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The impact of the price variables is in the same direction as for the perception of 
prices. Local calls prices, and marginally the national ones, enter significantly but 
with positive sign. As before, thus, an increase of prices is interpreted by the 
customers as an increase in the quality of the service. On the contrary, for the 
international calls prices, the effect is negative. 
Country fixed effects are very limited, indicating not substantial differences 
among the perception of satisfaction about the quality of the telecom services 
across the 15 EU Countries investigated. 
Table 10 about here 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
Although the empirical analysis of fixed telephony prices is severely constrained 
by data limitations, it is entirely new. It has a wider scope than previous empirical 
work at EU level, either by the European Commission, the OECD or by national 
regulatory bodies. The analysis is based on the best evidence available to any 
researcher from official sources, such as Eurostat, Eurobarometer, OECD, ITU. 
The findings suggest that ownership change, from public to private, plays no role 
or a very limited one in explaining prices of international, national, local calls, 
connection charges. Thus, one key item of the reforms, privatization of the 
telecom incumbent, does not seem to be clearly supported by empirical evidence. 
The market share of entrants seems to play a more positive role, as one would 
expect in a more competitive environment, but the result is not very strong. The 
indicator for entry regulation has very limited explanatory power (or even has the 
“wrong” sign). 
Overall, it seems that technology and demand factors, combined with unidentified 
country features, have much more explanatory power than any of the regulatory 
variables. 
The results are not to be interpreted as an outright rejection of the reforms. 
Perhaps the OECD regulatory indicators fail to capture the subtle details of the 
reforms, but the Market Opening Milestones data used by Copenhagen Economics 
(2005a; 2005b) in an important study commissioned and frequently cited by the 
European Commission (Commission of the European Community, 2007a; 2007b) 
do not seem to add much to the OECD indicators. Future research should try to 
expand the empirical analysis by type of services, technology, demand variables, 
and better regulatory variables. 
Having said this, up to now it would be less than prudent to state that the 
telecommunication reform experiment in the EU is supported by clear empirical 
evidence, at least for fixed telephony, of substantial benefits for the consumers 
across all countries. It is probably too early to discern policy implications from 
these findings, but two of them may be suggested for future investigation. 
While being prudent in the interpretation, given data limitation, it seems that in 
some countries and under some circumstances public ownership of at least some 
part of the industry cannot be dismissed. There is some evidence that the market  
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impact of competition does not seem to be affected by public ownership. This 
finding should be considered in the recent debates in the EU about who should 
own the main telecom networks. Should ownership separation of the network be 
implemented, public ownership of it is still an option to be considered. Moreover, 
if the network is not going to be separated from the incumbent, a public stake into 
the incumbent is an alternative option to be considered as well. 
It seems that there is still wide scope for the EU governments to think about their 
active role in the design of a telecommunication policy. Consumers’ subjective 
satisfaction broadly reflects the objective evidence, and this is also of interest for 
policy-makers. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Description of the variables used in the regressions for the dynamics of prices 
Variable Description 
price international Price of international calls – PPP adjusted (log) 
price  
national Price of national calls – PPP adjusted (log) 
price  
local Price of local calls – PPP adjusted (log) 
connection charge Connection charge – PPP adjusted (log) 
ATRI Aggregate Telecommunications Regulatory Indicator (REGREF - log) 
Entry regulation is a an indicator of legal conditions of entry in the market and can assume three values only: 0 (free entry), 1 (oligopoly) and 2 (monopoly) (REGREF). 
Public ownership percentage of shares in the PTO owned by government: it is coded between 0 (private ownership) to 100 (public ownership) (REGREF -log). 
Market structure (100- market share of new entrants): it is coded from 0 to 100 (REGREF - log) 
Lines number of fixed telecom lines/population (ITU - log) 
Investment amount of investment in the telecommunication sector/number of lines (ITU - log) 
Isdn  
Channels number if ISDN channels/number of lines (ITU - log) 
Mob subscribers number of subscribers in the mobile telephone sector/pop (ITU - log)  
Density Population/surface (ITU - log) 
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Table 2: Mean (above) and standard deviation (below) for the variables in regressions 
for the dynamics of prices (the variables are not expressed in log terms) 
 
price 
international 
(PPP adjusted 
- Euro) 
price 
national 
(PPP 
adjusted 
- Euro) 
price 
local 
(PPP 
adjusted 
- Euro)
connection 
charge 
(PPP djusted
- Euro) 
lines Investment isdn channels 
Mob 
subscribers density 
Austria 0.220 0.087 0.042 109.094 0.492 2.842 0.207 0.609 95.822
 0.080 0.049 0.009 14.597 0.010 0.897 0.096 0.294 0.795
Belgium 0.190 0.066 0.033 67.689 0.481 2.132 0.175 0.498 336.767
 0.098 0.030 0.001 6.866 0.012 0.588 0.068 0.305 2.473
Denmark 0.173 0.036 0.026 134.797 0.682 2.469 0.200 0.603 123.811
 0.070 0.016 0.003 19.423 0.032 0.495 0.091 0.234 1.003
Finland  0.249 0.056 0.014 208.881 0.538 2.636 0.192 0.701 15.373
 0.059 0.001 0.000 139.863 0.023 0.283 0.090 0.177 0.078
France 0.149 0.070 0.027 47.561 0.576 1.807 0.109 0.445 107.856
 0.068 0.015 0.002 4.794 0.006 0.216 0.033 0.234 1.175
Germany 0.126 0.086 0.029 47.839 0.608 1.629 0.341 0.475 230.490
 0.093 0.040 0.001 7.690 0.041 0.402 0.123 0.282 0.602
Greece 0.165 0.081 0.014 56.141 0.536 1.603 0.070 0.513 81.621
 0.071 0.046 0.004 48.200 0.019 0.747 0.069 0.301 2.620
Ireland 0.126 0.069 0.032 141.574 0.470 2.242 0.124 0.560 54.163
 0.046 0.030 0.005 36.883 0.028 0.802 0.064 0.280 1.664
Italy 0.152 0.073 0.015 133.108 0.464 2.344 0.146 0.664 190.521
 0.078 0.021 0.000 21.354 0.012 0.380 0.075 0.307 1.667
Luxemburg 0.136 . 0.022 65.313 0.577 3.006 0.464 0.689 168.530
 0.101 . 0.003 14.646 0.023 0.752 0.241 0.392 4.129
Netherlands 0.104 0.037 0.020 90.837 0.552 2.414 0.309 0.534 384.751
 0.114 0.014 0.002 37.392 0.057 0.658 0.152 0.285 5.587
Portugal 0.174 0.074 0.017 75.806 0.417 3.303 0.127 0.593 110.054
 0.084 0.036 0.001 11.163 0.010 0.973 0.056 0.294 2.458
Spain 0.162 0.095 0.017 123.940 0.416 2.506 0.095 0.522 80.703
 0.071 0.040 0.003 33.792 0.011 1.144 0.064 0.310 2.028
Sweden 0.122 0.029 0.019 127.700 0.734 2.023 0.113 0.685 19.771
 0.095 0.015 0.001 . 0.018 1.017 0.051 0.228 0.109
UK 0.132 0.050 0.036 148.917 0.568 3.727 0.093 0.586 244.759
 0.026 0.009 0.003 26.269 0.016 0.593 0.037 0.300 1.560
         
Total 0.159 0.065 0.024 104.167 0.541 2.446 0.185 0.578 149.666
  0.083 0.034 0.009 62.591 0.090 0.884 0.143 0.277 106.414
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Table 3: correlations among the variables used in the regressions for the dynamics of prices 
  
Price international price national 
price 
local 
connection 
charge ATRI 
Entry 
regulation 
Public 
ownership
Market 
structure lines Investment
Isdn 
channels
Mob 
subscribers Density 
price 
international 1             
price  
national 0.713* 1            
price  
local 0.086 0.060 1           
connection 
charge 0.392* 0.078 0.100 1          
ATRI 0.423* 0.531* -0.035 -0.078 1         
Entry 
regulation 0.483* 0.615* -0.051 -0.088 0.890* 1        
Public 
ownership 0.044 0.110 -0.055 -0.215* 0.760* 0.523* 1       
Market 
structure 0.100 0.368* 0.059 -0.306* 0.707* 0.692* 0.319* 1      
Lines -0.171* -0.411* 0.153 -0.109 -0.425* -0.476* -0.225* -0.336* 1     
Investment 0.050 -0.045 0.162 0.171* -0.350* -0.186* -0.238* -0.246* -0.091 1    
Isdn  
Channels -0.585* -0.550* 0.170 -0.338* -0.705* -0.683* -0.428* -0.506* 0.578* 0.1956* 1   
Mob 
subscribers -0.221* -0.487* -0.115 -0.050 -0.550* -0.563* -0.320* -0.410* 0.704* 0.3173* 0.748* 1  
Density -0.193* 0.047 0.332* -0.365* -0.060 0.044 -0.083 0.159* -0.071 0.0828 0.105* -0.107* 1 
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Table 4: Satisfaction about prices and quality of the telecom services 
Price Quality 
excessive 3,844 not satisfied very bad 302 
not satisfied Unfair 12,921 fairly bad 1,914 
Fair 25,056 satisfied 
fairly good 23,266 
very good 16,774 satisfied 
 
 
Table 5: Distribution of consumer satisfaction across countries 
 Price Quality 
Country n. obs satisfied % n. obs satisfied % 
UK 3641 2819 77.4 3711 1733 46.7 
Austria 2425 1502 61.9 2422 1199 49.5 
Belgium 2712 1490 54.9 2726 1183 43.4 
Denmark 2782 2081 74.8 2824 1647 58.3 
Finland  2527 1520 60.2 2543 1038 40.8 
France 2710 1478 54.5 2745 923 33.6 
Germany 4962 3519 70.9 4969 1518 30.5 
Greece 2859 1181 41.3 2856 733 25.7 
Ireland 2549 1689 66.3 2635 1552 58.9 
Italy 2593 805 31.0 2604 373 14.3 
Luxemburg 1606 1128 70.2 1634 895 54.8 
Netherlands 2841 1879 66.1 2878 1450 50.4 
Portugal 2098 833 39.7 2134 213 10.0 
Spain 2627 1111 42.3 2654 562 21.2 
Sweden 2889 2021 70.0 2921 1755 60.1 
       
Total 41821 25056 59.9 42256 16774 39.7 
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Table 6: Estimates for the International calls price equation 
 International calls price 
VARIABLES A B C D 
 
log(ATRI) 0.404*** 0.040   
 (0.151) (0.175)   
Entry regulation   0.010 -0.024 
   (0.023) (0.023) 
log(Public ownership)   0.002 0.008 
   (0.023) (0.021) 
log(Market structure)   0.865*** 0.287 
   (0.315) (0.322) 
log(lines) -2.727** -1.537 -2.138* -0.917 
 (1.232) (1.197) (1.263) (1.194) 
log(investments) -1.014*** -0.733** -0.639* -0.460 
 (0.326) (0.314) (0.326) (0.301) 
log(isdn_channels) -0.131 0.033 -0.191** 0.039 
 (0.083) (0.087) (0.079) (0.090) 
log(mob subscribers)  -0.471***  -0.534*** 
  (0.132)  (0.132) 
log(density) -0.686 -1.248 -4.997 -3.854 
 (3.299) (3.073) (3.255) (2.980) 
 -4.792 0.269 14.470 12.565 
Constant (15.672) (14.324) (15.448) (13.693) 
     
Observations 92 92 93 93 
R-squared 0.658 0.709 0.658 0.721 
Number of country_id 15 15 15 15 
J test 1.34 1.29 0.84 0.82 
p value 0.24 0.732 0.359 0.8435 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) -1.10 -1.03 -1.16 -1.54 
p value 0.273 0.302 0.245 0.124 
Hausman Test 18.04 64.65 29.82 27.84 
P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Estimates for the National calls price equation 
 National calls price 
VARIABLES A B C D 
         
log(ATRI) 0.343*** 0.174   
 (0.099) (0.119)   
Entry regulation   0.020 0.007 
   (0.015) (0.015) 
log(Public ownership)   0.003 0.004 
   (0.015) (0.014) 
log(Market structure)   0.579*** 0.370* 
   (0.198) (0.221) 
log(lines) -1.511* -0.865 -1.621* -0.950 
 (0.807) (0.817) (0.813) (0.844) 
log(investments) -0.582*** -0.450** -0.551** -0.441** 
 (0.214) (0.214) (0.216) (0.218) 
log(isdn_channels) -0.154*** -0.081 -0.180*** -0.102* 
 (0.054) (0.060) (0.050) (0.061) 
log(mob subscribers)  -0.216**  -0.193** 
  (0.090)  (0.094) 
log(density) -3.240 -3.437 -3.860* -3.870* 
 (2.161) (2.099) (2.161) (2.117) 
Constant 6.780 10.415 8.876 12.148 
 (10.257) (9.775) (10.249) (9.799) 
     
Observations 91 91 91 91 
R-squared 0.774 0.791 0.783 0.795 
Number of country_id 14 14 14 14 
J test 0.2 0.33 0.71 0.64 
p value 0.655 0.954 0.399 0.888 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) -0.81 -1.17 -1.46 -1.48 
p value 0.419 0.241 0.145 0.140 
Hausman Test 58.67 19.58 23.52 18.34 
P value 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.011** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 8: Estimates for the Local calls price equation 
 Local calls price 
VARIABLES A B C D 
          
log(ATRI) 0.221*** 0.209***   
 (0.047) (0.059)   
Entry regulation   -0.009 -0.013* 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Public ownership)   0.019*** 0.019*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
log(Market structure)   0.452*** 0.361*** 
   (0.095) (0.105) 
log(lines) -0.601 -0.722* -0.455 -0.420 
 (0.386) (0.405) (0.380) (0.388) 
log(investments) -0.098 -0.087 0.028 0.055 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.098) (0.098) 
log(isdn_channels) 0.163*** 0.167*** 0.127*** 0.158*** 
 (0.026) (0.030) (0.024) (0.029) 
log(mob subscribers)  -0.015  -0.078* 
  (0.044)  (0.043) 
log(density) -1.568 -1.639 -3.567*** -3.386*** 
 (1.034) (1.039) (0.980) (0.969) 
Constant -1.086 -3.430 7.788* 4.919 
 (4.911) (4.844) (4.649) (4.451) 
     
Observations 92 92 93 93 
R-squared 0.391 0.396 0.426 0.453 
Number of country_id 15 15 15 15 
J test 0.29 0.47 1.64 0.33 
p value 0.590 0.925 0.200 0.67 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) -1.27 -1.26 -1.45 -1.59 
p value 0.204 0.206 0.147 0.111 
Hausman Test 72.97 18.51 25.41 15.35 
P value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 9: Estimates for the Connection charge equation 
 Connection charge 
VARIABLES A B C D 
          
log(ATRI) 0.211** -0.057   
 (0.105) (0.138)   
Entry regulation   -0.019 -0.058*** 
   (0.018) (0.017) 
log(Public ownership)   -0.001 -0.001 
   (0.014) (0.013) 
log(Market structure)   0.278 -0.232 
   (0.245) (0.241) 
log(lines) 2.380** 3.174*** 2.417* 2.491** 
 (1.129) (1.115) (1.249) (1.044) 
log(investments) -0.289 -0.154 -0.222 -0.062 
 (0.271) (0.263) (0.273) (0.247) 
log(isdn_channels) -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.124*** -0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.027) (0.009) 
log(mob subscribers)  -0.215***  -0.333*** 
  (0.075)  (0.069) 
log(density) -3.975 -3.519 -6.255** -3.692 
 (2.798) (2.687) (2.513) (2.283) 
Constant 20.150 19.990 30.531** 21.091* 
 (13.319) (12.734) (11.924) (10.716) 
     
Observations 100 100 101 101 
R-squared 0.445 0.497 0.434 0.564 
Number of country_id 15 15 15 15 
J test 1.89 0.63 1.2 1.01 
p value 0.169 0.889 0.273 0.603 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) -0.06 0.33 -0.05 -0.10 
p value 0.954 0.745 0.962 0.922 
Hausman Test 8.73 15.77 120.90 16.83 
P value 0.071* 0.007*** 0.000*** 0.009*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 10: Consumers’ satisfaction: main estimation results from the probit model. 
 Marginal Effects 
 Price Quality 
Price local calls 0.137** 0.367*** 0.206*** 0.485*** 
Price national calls -0.063** -0.099*** 0.058* 0.024 
Price international calls -0.220*** -0.260*** -0.061* -0.121*** 
  
Entry regulation 0.028*** 0.037*** 
Public ownership -0.028** -0.017 
Market structure -0.062*** -0.105*** 
  
Female -0.016** -0.016** -0.005 -0.005 
Age -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.002 
Age^2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
single 0.004 0.005 -0.012 -0.011 
separated/divorced/widowed -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.017* -0.015 
Age when finished education 0.010*** 0.010*** -0.002 -0.002 
Age when finished education^2 -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
manager -0.022 -0.021 0.011 0.013 
other white collar -0.017 -0.017 0.001 0.001 
manual worker -0.023 -0.023 -0.025* -0.025* 
house person -0.009 -0.009 0.008 0.007 
unemployed -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.030 -0.030 
retired -0.035* -0.035** -0.011 -0.012 
student 0.149*** 0.147*** -0.030 -0.033 
political views: centre 0.024** 0.024** 0.010 0.009 
political views: right -0.003 -0.003 0.027** 0.028*** 
political views: d.k./n.a. -0.016 -0.015 0.002 0.002 
respondent's cooperation: average/bad -0.029** -0.030** -0.034*** -0.035*** 
Population Density 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.001 -0.002 
Real GDP growth Rate 0.014* 0.01 0.034*** 0.031*** 
Inflation Rate 0.029*** 0.047*** -0.010 0.006 
CPI 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 
 GDP per capita -0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.004* 
Yearly employment growth -0.006 -0.004 0.014** 0.019*** 
GINI -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.008* -0.002 
year=2002 -0.038 -0.111*** 0.041* -0.055** 
year=2004 0.093*** 0.024 0.057*** -0.039 
Austria  0.437*** 0.435*** 0.103 -0.175 
Belgium  -0.626*** -0.620*** -0.181 0.374 
Denmark  0.425*** 0.423*** 0.302 0.076 
Finland  0.443*** 0.442*** 0.277 -0.114 
France  0.643*** 0.647*** -0.025 -0.154 
Germany  -0.204** -0.022 -0.163** 0.031 
Greece  0.455*** 0.46 -0.122 -0.047 
Ireland  0.426*** 0.424*** 0.176 -0.162 
Italy  0.006 0.201*** -0.216* 0.019 
Luxemburg  
Netherlands  -0.746*** -0.728 -0.175 0.626* 
Portugal  0.433*** 0.436*** -0.207 -0.083 
Spain  0.584*** 0.595*** -0.148 -0.129 
Sweden  0.466*** 0.465*** 0.342 0.005 
Constant -6.104** -4.633** 2.724 4.953** 
  
Observations 38479 38479 38847 38847 
Pseudo-R2 0.121 0.119 0.067 0.068 
Frequency of  correct predictions (%) 66.1 66.3 63.9 64.1 
Log-Likelihood -22987.6 -23027 -22959.265 -22929.967 
Robust p values in brackets - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
